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Do incumbents  use social programs  to get themselves re-elected? Much theoretical and empirical
work on public expenditure  patterns in democratic regimes argues that politicians  manipulate  the timing,
composition, and geographic  distribution of expenditures  to maximize  the likelihood of remaining  in
office. Increases in public expenditures are timed to coincide with upcoming elections; budgetary trade-
offs are made to satisfy important  constituencies; and expenditures  are directed towards areas of the
country  that are considered  critical for an incumbent's re-election bid.
This paper discusses the relationship  between elections and the expenditures made by the Peruvian
Social Fund (FONCODES) during President Alberto Fujimori's first tern  in office (1990-1995).
FONCODES was created in 1991, during a severe recession which followed the adoption of stringent
stabilization  and structural adjustment measures  by the Fujimori government. Its stated objectives were
to generate employment,  help alleviate poverty, and improve access to social services (World Bank
1998). By 1993,  the Peruvian economy had begun a remarkable  recovery, and FONCODES was being
hailed by govermnent  officials and foreign donors alike as an important component  of a medium-term
strategy  to reduce poverty.
Scholars in Peru and abroad have generally been more guarded in their praise.  Critics argue that
social funds like FONCODES undermine line ministries and local governments. And questions about the
"politicization"  of FONCODES  have bedeviled the program from its creation (Graham 1994, Kay 1995,
Ball6n and Beaumont 1996). Yet there are no satisfactory studies of the impact of elections on
FONCODES  expenditures.
This paper attempts to fill this gap using highly disaggregated  data on expenditures, socio-
economic indicators, and electoral outcomes. I use econometric  techniques to analyze the timing and
geographic distribution  of FONCODES expenditures,  and reach two main conclusions. First,
FONCODES  expenditures increased significantly  prior to national elections. Second, FONCODES
projects were directed to provinces in which the marginal political impact of expenditures  was likely to be
largest. The results are robust to a large number of specifications  and controls. The Peruvian data thus
support predictions made in the literature on "political business cycles" (Nordhaus 1975,  Rogoff 1990) as
well as the literature on political influences on the allocation of discretionary funds (Wright 1974,  Cox
and McCubbins 1986, Lindbeck  and Weibull 1987,  Dixit and Londregan 1996, Case 1997).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of Peruvian
politics between 1990 and 1995,  and FONCODES. Section 3 describes data requirements and sources for
the paper.  Section  4 estimates the effect of the electoral calendar on the timing of FONCODES
I Moncada  (1996)  and  Graham  and  Kane  (1998)  discuss  the timing  and distribution  of  FONCODES  expenditures,
respectively.  As I discuss  below,  however,  both  papers  have  serious  limitations.
2expenditures. Section 5 estimates the effect of the 1990 presidential election on the distribution of
expenditures. Section 6 concludes with some general thoughts on the use of social expenditures for
electoral  purposes.
2.  The Fujimori years and FONCODES
The election of the dark horse candidate Alberto Fuji:mori  to the Peruvian presidency in 1990
marked  the beginning of a fundamental  transformation  of Peruvian politics. Fujimori, an independent
with no political party to speak of, defeated  the coalition of center-right parties headed by the well-known
novelist Mario Vargas Llosa. Fujimori's party did not, however,  win a majority in either house of the
Peruvian congress. Blaming  Peru's "corrupt" institutions  for his inability to introduce a coherent
economic program or combat the terrorist insurgencies  of Shining Path and the Tupac Amaru, Fujimori
used the military to shut down congress and the judiciary in April 1992. Under international  pressure to
restore democracy,  he drafted a new constitution which was approved by a small margin in a referendum
held in October 1993,  and won a landslide re-election  to the presidency  and a majority for his party in the
new uni-cameral  congress in April 1995.
The academic  literature on Peru argues that traditional sources of authority and intermediation
between citizens and the state have been weakened during F'resident  Fujimori's period in office
(McClintock 1993,  Cameron 1994,  Mauceri 1995,  Conaghan 1996, Seddon 1997). The "historical"
political parties have all but disappeared. 2 The legislative and judiciary branches of government  have not
acted as an effective check on the executive. 3 There have also been important changes in the relationship
between various levels of government, and in the conduct of social policy. Decree 776, passed in
December 1993, abolished most sources of tax revenue traditionally  used by municipal governments.
Meanwhile, responsibility  for the administration  of numerous social and basic infrastructure  programs has
been transferred from local governments and line ministries in education, health, and transportation to the
Ministry of the Presidency. By 1995,  this Ministry controlled  more than 20% of the central government
2 The  four  major  parties  which  dominated  civilian  politics  in Peru  for decades  have  become  irrelevant.  These  four
parties--the  conservative  Popular  Christian  Party,  the center-right  Popular  Action,  the center-left  APRA,  and  the left-
wing  United  Left-jointly  garnered  82.2%  and 97%  of the vote  in the presidential  elections  of 1980  and 1985,
respectively.  In the 1995  presidential  election  they  won  a mere  6.3%  of the vote  (Tuesta,  1994;  Jurado  Nacional  de
Elecciones,  1995). Cambio  90-Nueva  Mayoria,  president  Fujimori's  party,  has  no outstanding  leaders  other  than the
president  himself.  Independent  candidates  with  no affiliation  to any  party  have  dominated  local  politics.  In the 1993
municipal  elections,  for example,  independent  candidates  receivel  almost  two-thirds  (64.7%)  of the votes  cast
(Tuesta,  1995,  p. 106).
3 The legislative,  where  Fujimori's  party  has  had  an absolute  majority  since  1992,  rubber-stamps  the President's
initiatives;  on the only  important  occasion  on which  the Supreme  Court  contravened  Fujimori's  wishes,  ruling  that  a
draft  law  which  would  allow  Fujimori  to  run for  a second  re-election  in  the year  2000  was  unconstitutional,  the three
members  who  had  voted  with  the majority  opinion  were dismissedl  from  the bench.
3budget, and oversaw  thirteen programs involved  in, amongst other things, nutrition, education,  health,
water, sanitation,  and housing (World  Bank 1996,  p.2).
FONCODES is one of the new programs created by President Fujimori. Its charter establishes it as
an "autonomous body" outside  the traditional line ministries. By law, the FONCODES executive director
reports directly  to a five-member  Board of Directors appointed by the President. This institutional  set-up
raised concerns that FONCODES could easily  become a means for dispensing  pork, and these misgivings
were reinforced when Luz Salgado, a former  head of President  Fujimori's party, was appointed as
FONCODES' first executive director (Graham 1994, p. 108). Subsequent  directors have been recruited
from the private sector (Arturo Woodman,  Alejandro Afuso) and from other branches of government
(Manuel Estela, Manuel  Vara Ochoa), and this has helped dispel some of the initial concerns.  Over time,
FONCODES has also improved coordination  in the planning, execution,  operation  and maintenance  of
projects with the line ministries and, to a lesser extent, with local governments  and NGOs.
Between  December 1991  and May 1995,  FONCODES  funded almost 16,000 community-based
projects, for a total budget of about 465 million soles. 4 At the 1992  exchange rate, this was equivalent to
roughly US $ 285 million. The average project  size was therefore quite small--about  US $ 18,000. These
community-based  projects include nutrition and family planning  projects, rotating credit schemes, and
projects for the construction or rehabilitation  of schools, health posts, water and sanitation systems, rural
roads, electrification  schemes, and small-scale  irrigation works. In addition, FONCODES  has executed a
series of centrally-designed  "special" projects which have included, inter alia, a school  breakfast
program, the distribution  of uniforms for schoolchildren,  shovels for farmers, and motorized  canoes for
isolated  jungle communities. Between December 1991 and May 1995,  FONCODES spent about 135
million soles (about US $ 83 million) on these special projects. In 1993, FONCODES  expenditures
accounted for roughly 0.55% of GNP--more  or less in the same order of magnitude as the Mexican
Solidarity  program, which accounted for about 0.71% of GNP in 1992.
FONCODES  has much in common  with other social funds in the region (Glaessner et. al. 1994).
The bulk of FONCODES projects are demand-driven  and targeted. FONCODES' community-based
projects (but not the special  projects) are demand-driven  in that communities  themselves choose a project
from a menu and prepare a proposal for funding.  FONCODES  then functions as a financial intermediary:
rather than execute  projects itself, it approves  proposals and releases funds to the nucleo ejecutor--a  group
of community members elected specifically  for this purpose. FONCODES  also targets its investments-
4 All  expenditures  are in constant  1992  soles,  unless  otherwise  indicated.
4first, by using a "poverty map" to assign  resources  to small geographic areas, and then conducting an
informal on-site assessment of the "poverty" of the community requesting a project. 5
3.  The data set
In 1997,  Peru was divided into 13 administrative  regions, 24 departments,  194 provinces, and 1812
districts (Webb and Femrndez Baca 1997,  p. 112). Regions and departments  are administrative  arms of
the central government, which appoints a governor for every region. Provincial and district-level  mayors
are chosen at municipal elections every three years. Data on FONCODES expenditures,  socio-economic
characteristics,  and voting patterns is available at different levels of geographic aggregation.
FONCODES  itself keeps monthly records on the number of projects and aggregate amounts spent
in each district. Three points are worth noting about these data. First, because expenditures  are recorded
in the month in which a project is approved,  there is a lag of about two weeks before disbursement of the
first installment of funds, and of several months before the second (and final) disbursement. Second, only
expenditures on projects are included, and not administrative  costs or expenses for general overhead.
Third, district-level  information  on the distribution  of expenditures is only available for the cornmunity-
based projects. There is no information on the allocation formulas or the actual distribution of the special
projects.
The Peruvian  National Statistical  Institute (INEI) has estimated  population size, the proportion
rural, and a host of socio-economic  indicators at the district level. Most of these indicators are based on a
population and housing census conducted in 1993. The one important  exception is the rate of chronic
malnutrition, which is based on a census of height and weight amongst schoolchildren  also conducted in
1993.
The Jurado Nacional de Elecciones, the body which supervises elections in Peru, keeps records on
electoral outcomes for elections held since 1990. Some of these data have also been compiled and
published (Tuesta 1994,  Jurado Nacional de Elecciones). Results are generally available  for all provinces
in the country, and for all districts in Metropolitan Lima.
The level of aggregation  used for the analysis in this paper was dictated by theoretical
considerations  and the availability  of data.  Section  4 uses national aggregates of FONCODES
expenditures  to analyze the relationship  between  the timing of expenditures and the electoral calendar.
Sources of funding and the administration  of the community-based  and special projects are different, so
the analysis is broken down by project type. FONCODES has assigned  resources to individual provinces
since 1993, and to individual districts since 1996. Section 5 uses a province-level  data set to analyze  the
5 Note,  however,  that  even  without  political  interference  actual  expenditures  in a given  province  would  rarely  be
equal  to allocations  because  of the demand-driven  nature  of the program.
5influence of electoral  outcomes on the geographic distribution  of FONCODES  expenditures for
community-based  projects. To avoid having one data point account for 5.78 million inhabitants--more
than a quarter of the population of the entire country--the province of Metropolitan Lima has been further
divided into its districts. The term "province" is used throughout the paper to refer to districts in
Metropolitan Lima and provinces elsewhere.
4.  The timing of FONCODES expenditures
This section discusses  the possible effect of the electoral calendar on the timing of FONCODES
expenditures. I briefly review the literature, discuss econometric specifications, and present results.
There is a long-standing  debate about the extent to which politicians can successfully manipulate
the economy to coincide with elections. The traditional political business cycle literature predicts
increases in expenditures  before an election (Nordhaus, Tufte 1978). Although  the assumptions
underlying these models were brought into question with the advent of rational expectations  theory,
Rogoff shows  that political business cycles could be expected  to occur even if voters are fully rational  but
there are information asymmetries  between  voters and incumbents.
The empirical  evidence from Less Developed  Countries (LDCs) tends to support the predictions
made in the political business cycle literature. In a study covering seventeen Latin American countries
over 35 years, Ames (1987) shows significant increases in total public sector expenditures in electoral
years. More recently, Schuknecht (1996) finds further evidence for political business cycles in a study
which covers 35 countries in the 1970 to 1992  period.  Rodrik (1991, cited in Waterbury 1993,  p. 201)
and Buffie and Sangines  Krause (1989, pp. 144-45)  also observe pre-electoral expansions in Turkey and
Mexico, respectively. One partial exception  to this body of evidence is Remmer (1993), who uses recent
data from six Latin American countries to argue that economic conditions generally deteriorated in the
period leading up to an election and improved  thereafter. This suggests that politicians may try, but are
often unable to manipulate macro-economic  variables successfully,  an argument  which has also been
made for Western Europe (Lewis-Beck 1988). A different issue, which has not been resolved in the
empirical literature, is whether voters in LDCs actually reward  politicians for their pre-electoral  spending
sprees (Dornbusch  and Edwards 1991, Stokes 1996a).
Political manipulation of expenditures is likely to have different implications when it is concerned
with a specific program like FONCODES rather  than the aggregate macroeconomy. The stakes are
obviously lower: it may be easier and less risky to try to accurately  time the disbursement  of funds from a
specific program like FONCODES, but the electoral returns from such spending sprees are also likely to
be smaller. Still, political manipulation of specific social programs  like FONCODES may be one of the
6few remaining ways a government  committed  to an agenda of low inflation, fiscal responsibility,  and a
stable exchange  rate can attempt to influence  the vote in the months leading up to an election.
Moncada presents a simple time line of quarterly  FONCODES expenditures and elections between
1991 and 1995. Interpretation of Moncada's graph is not easy, however,  because elections do not always
fall conveniently  at the end of a quarter. Nor does Moncada formally  test the relationship between
elections and expenditures--perhaps  because of the small number of quarters (16 quarters) and the large
number of national elections (3 elections) during  the period.
Figure 1  graphs monthly data for the amounts approved for community-based  and special projects
between November 1991  and May 1995. The chart shows  that expenditures are highly irregular,
especially (but not only) for the special  projects. There are at least four distinct spikes in total
expenditures. Three of these spikes coincide with the three national elections held during the period-the
November 22, 1992  election to the constituent  assembly (month=13),  the October 31, 1993  referendum
(month=24),  and the April 9, 1995  presidential election (month=42). Figure 1 thus provides some  prima
facie  evidence  that FONCODES expenditures  were affected by elections.
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a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Estimates of election effects
If there is a political expenditure  cycle, FONCODES  expenditures at a particular point should be a
function of the electoral calendar:
(1)  Expt =f(Elecb  zd
where Expt stands  for FONCODES expenditures  in time t, Elect  is the presence (or absence) of an
election at the end of time period t, and z, is a vector  of exogenous variables which affect expenditures.
The timing of elections is taken to be determined  outside the model. Insofar as it is easier to manipulate
the timing of FONCODES expenditures  than the timing of elections,  this is a reasonable  assumption.
Table 1 reports results of OLS regressions  of total expenditures and expenditures for comnunity-
based and special projects on electoral dummies, a linear time trend, and quarterly seasonal dummies.
Columns (i), (iii) and (v) report results from the regressions of expenditures on a single electoral dummy
variable which takes on the value one for the three months immediately  prior to an election, and zero
otherwise. 6 Columns  (ii), (iv) and (vi) include three separate electoral dummies to allow the effect of
elections on expenditures  to vary by election.
Table 1: The impact of elections on the timing of FONCODES expenditures
Community-based  projects  Special projects  Total expenditures
(i)  (ii  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)
ELECTION  7.05**  - 5.07**  - 12.72***  -
(2.03)  (2.39)  (2.78)
Election 1  - 6.08  - 0.82  - 3.73
(1.14)  (0.36)  (0.57)
Election 2  - 4.51  - 14.74***  - 21.84**
(0.69)  (3.53)  (2.58)
Election 3  - 10.49  - 11.72***  - 17.93**
(1.61)  (2.73)  (2.11)
Monthly linear trend  0.04  0.03  0.04  -0.00  0.09  0.01
(0.30)  (0.15)  (0.85)  (0.09)  (0.60)  (0.08)
Seasonal dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)  1.20  1.22  2.45  2.43  1.49  1.42
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed)  2.13  2.10  2.00  2.05  2.03  2.06
R-squared  0.167  0.173  0.278  0.370  0.274  0.328
Number of observations  42  42  42  42  42  42
* indicates  significance  at the 10%  level;  **indicates  significance  at the 5%  level;  ***  indicates  significance  at the
1%  level.
Note: Absolute  t-statistics  are reported  in  brackets,  and  are corrected  for serial  correlation  using  the Cochrane-Orcutt
procedure.  A constant  was calculated  but is not  reported.
6 Because  of the two-week  time  lag between  approval  of a project  and disbursement  of funds,  the relevant  month  for
the parameter  Elect  in equation (1)  is taken  to be that in  which  the project  was approved  if the election  took  place  in
the second  half of the month,  but the month  preceding  it if the election  took  place  in the first  half of the month.
8The results in Table 1 confirm the general picture in Figure 1. The electoral parameter in columns
(i), (iii) and (v) is positive and significart at the 5% level or better in all three specifications. This
suggests that expenditures  on both comrnunity-based  projects and special projects were significantly
higher than expected in the three months leading up to elections. When the three elections enter into the
regression separately, the influence  of elections on the timing of expenditures is most apparent for the
special  projects, especially for the October 1993  referendum  and the April 1995 presidential election. 7
The empirical  analysis above suggests  that Fujimori  boosted FONCODES expenditures  when it
mattered most. But there are obviously other factors at work. Consider, for example, the expenditure
spike in September 1994 (month=35),  the second-largest  in 1he data set.  In August 1994, Manuel  Vara
Ochoa replaced Manuel Estela as the executive director of FONCODES. Estela was a technocrat who
was highly regarded at the World Bank and the Inter-American  Development Bank.  Prior to being
appointed executive director of FONCODES,  he had been the head of SUNAT, the govemrnment  agency
charged with the collection of taxes in Peru.  Estela brought to FONCODES his advisors from SUNAT,
and a working method which emphasized a rigorous screening of project  proposals. This was not,
however, to Fujimori's liking, and the president quickly became dissatisfied  with Estela's unwillingness
to meet "disbursement targets".  Estela's replacement,  Manuel Vara Ochoa, was a friend of President
Fujimori's from their days together as professors at the Agrarian University in Lima, and was understood
to be more sensitive  to the political importance of a speedy  approval process. The massive spike in
expenditures in September 1994  may be a result of the wholesale approval of projects which had not been
funded during the Estela period.
In conclusion, there is some evidence of a political expenditure cycle in FONCODES  projects, but
the electoral calendar is by no means the only determinant  of changes in FONCODES expenditures
between 1991 and 1995.
7 The  changing  political  context  in  Peru  may  explain  differences  in the effect  of elections  on FONCODES
expenditures.  The Fujimori  government  had much  at stake  in the October  1993  referendum  and  the April 1995
presidential  election.  The  referendum  on the new  constitution  was widely  seen  as a referendum  on  three  years  of
Fujimori  government  (Roberts  and  Arce 1998,  p. 229). Moreover,  the new  constitution  included  a clause  which
would  allow  Fujimori  to run  for re-election--something  which  he could  not to do under  the 1980  constitution.  The
April 1995  election,  meanwhile,  would  assure  Fujimori  five  more  years  as president.  By  contrast,  the November
1992  election  to the constituent  assembly  took  place at a time  when  the government  was  virtually  unchallenged:  the
opposition  was  in disarray  after Fujimori's  "self-coup"  of April 1992,  and  Fujimori's  popularity  was  very  high.
Indeed,  three  of the four  "historical"  parties--Popular  Action,  APRA,  and the  United  Left--did  not even  participate  in
the 1992  election,  alleging  that  this  would  "legitinize"  Fujimori's  zoup. The Popular  Christian  Party  participated,
but won only  9.8%  of the vote. Fujimori's  Cambio  90-Nueva  Mayoria  party  won  49.2%  of the vote,  and  44 of the
80 seats  in the constituent  assembly.  The  remaining  41%  of the vote  went  to smaller  parties,  many  of which  had
been  formed  shortly  before  the election.
8 Author's  conversations  with  staff  at FONCODES  and  at the Ministry  of the Presidency.  One  knowledgeable  staff
member  described  the relationship  between  Estela  and  Fujimori  as "strained"  and  related  a telephone  conversation  in
which  Fujimori  gave  Estela  a serious  warning  ("un  toque de atencion  de palacio").
95.  The geographic distribution  of FONCODES  expenditures
This section discusses the influence of elections on the geographic distribution  of FONCODES
expenditures on community-based  projects.  Specifically,  it tests a model in which  past electoral
outcomes are used to predictfuture expenditures. First, I briefly review the literature on the topic, and
describe  some features peculiar to the Peruvian setting. I next discuss the econometric specification, and
present results.
A basic theory of the determinants  of voting behavior might consider the affinity of voters for
different candidates (an "ideological"  component)  and the changes in welfare that voters can expect  to see
after an election (an "economic" component)  (Lindbeek and Weibull, Markus 1988,  Peltzman 1990, Dixit
and Londregan, Landon and Ryan 1997). If voters face a choice between an incumbent and his
challenger(s),  they might use the performance  of the incumbent while in office as a reasonable guide to
the policies they could expect to see enacted  if the incumbent were re-elected. 9 The probability that voter
i will vote for the incumbent at time t, Pit,  might then be described in the following  terms:
(2)  Pit= g(v 1, YirYit-l,  Wirwit-d
where v, is a time-invariant, non-economic  parameter which affects the vote. This parameter could
include voter i's perception of the incumbent's character, or the ideological affinity between voter i and
the incumbent. I assume that the parameter v, ranges from -oo  to x, representing strong dislike and like
for the incumbent, respectively;  Y 1t -Yi,, is a parameter that reflects aggregate changes in the economy
that can plausibly be attributed to the incumbent;  and W 1,-Wit_ 1 is a parameter  that measures the change in
net transfers (transfers-taxes)  for voter i during  the incumbent's previous period in office. '° By
assumption,  the function g is bounded between 0 and 1 over its support. If there is no abstention, the
expected number of votes for the incumbent  at time t is then given by the sum of all the Pit's.
How should a rational incumbent distribute  taxes and transfers across  the electorate to maximize
the expected number of votes in the next election? The answer to this question clearly depends on
whether a unit change in Wi,-W,t, has the same effect on Pit  across all i.  To simplify  the notation, I define
R, to be the change in the probability Pi,  that results from a unit change in net transfers Wit-Wit,,.  R, can
9Arguably,  voters  base  their decisions  on  the promises  made  by an incumbent  and his challenger(s)  before  an
election,  and  this  is the starting  point  for  much  theoretical  work  on the subject  (Cox  and  McCubbins,  Lindbeck  and
Weibull,  Dixit  and  Londregan).  Alas,  promises  can be  just that,  and  voters  may  not take them  to be a reliable
indication  of intended  behavior  in  office. The  issue  of the (lack  of) credibility  of promises  is particularly  relevant  in
Peru:  Fujimori  was elected  in 1990  on a platform  which  opposed  economic  "shock  therapy",  yet he implemented
one of the most  radical  orthodox  programs  to stabilize  and  re-structure  the economy  within  weeks  of taking  office
(Stokes,  Roberts  and  Arce). For this  reason,  I take Fujimori's  record  in office  to be a more  credible  indication  of his
intended  policies  than  any  campaign  promises.
'° "Sociotropic"  theories  of voting  generally  emphasize  aggregate  economic  trends,  whereas  "pocketbook"  theories
of voting  emphasize  changes  in individual  welfare  (see,  for example,  Markus).
10therefore be thought of as index of the "political productivity" of net transfers to different voters. R, is
itself a function of the initial, pre-transfer  income of voters and the parameter vi:
(3)  Ri = g(y 1, vJd
There are numerous competing  theories about the relationship between vi and R,. Cox and
McCubbins argue that R, is largest when transfers are made to voters with a value of v; which is large and
positive. There are two key insights here.  First, incumbents  may be risk-averse. Transfers by
incumbents  to "core supporters" whose needs and preferences  they understand better are likely to be a
safer investment  than transfers to other (unknown) voters. Second, there are administrative  costs and
inefficiencies which limit the fraction of transfers which actually materializes as a benefit to voters. This
fraction may be higher when incumbents  make transfers to ore  supporters.
Lindbeck and Weibull argue that R, is largest when transfers are made to "swing" or "marginal"
voters with a value of vi close to zero.  The intuition behind this result is that transfers to voters who
strongly  favor (oppose)  the incumbent are unlikely  to make aL  difference  as these voters will probably vote
for (against)  the incumbent regardless  of the transfer. Lindbeck  and Weibull extend their model  to
consider cases in which politicians seek  to maximize  the probability of being re-elected rather than the
expected number of votes. Under these circumstances, if candidates are not equally popular, Lindbeck
and Weibull show that supporters  of the more popular candicdate  are more likely to be "pivotal" voters
who could decide the outcome of the election. For any two values of vi which are identical in magnitude
but opposite in sign (avi, -avi), incumbents  should therefore favor supporters of the candidate who is
more popular.
Dixit and Londregan suggest  that the choice between a strategy which favors swing voters and one
which favors core supporters depends on whether incumbents can collect taxes and distribute benefits
more effectively among their supporters. In general, rational incumbents should favor swing voters when
there are no such differences, but core supporters  when there are."
Finally, one might consider dynamic models in which politicians  take into account changes, rather
than (or in addition to) levels of electoral support. Take the example of an incumbent who has already
survived (at least) one re-election. Can (s)he derive information  by comparing  the results from the most
recent election with those from prior elections? One strategy this incumbent might  try to follow would be
11  Dixit  and Londregan  also  propose  two  additional  parameters  which  should  affect  the decision  to favor  some
groups  over  others.  First,  for  any  given  value  of v,,  some  groups  are more  willing  than  others  to compromise  on
their  ideological  preferences  in exchange  for  material  rewards.  Those  groups  which  are less  attached  to their
ideology  should  expect  to receive  higher  transfers.  Second,  for two  groups  with  a value  of vi equal  to zero,  Dixit
and  Londregan  argue  that  rational  incumbents  will  favor  that  group  with  the lower  vanability.  This  is because  more
members  of that group  switch  their  votes  for any  given  transfer. In practice,  these  parameters  cannot  easily  be
identified  with  data on electoral  outcomes  and expenditures,  and  I cdo  not consider  them  further.
11to "buy back" traditional supporters who have recently backed opposition  candidates-either  because it is
cheaper or less risky to bring these voters back into the fold than to attract new supporters, or because
there are long-term  benefits to having a stable  base of support which are not captured by the formulation
in (2) and (3) above." 2
There is also controversy about the relationship between income and the political productivity of
transfers.  If there is diminishing marginal  utility of income, voters with low initial levels of income
should benefit more from a given transfer than their wealthier counterparts. The political productivity of
transfers to the poor should  therefore be higher (Lindbeck  and Weibull, Dixit and Londregan). However,
if the poor are less likely to vote than the non-poor, the negative correlation between Ri and yi may be
dampened, or become positive (Cox and McCubbins,  also Fleck 1994)."3  Note, finally,  that a negative
correlation  between  yi and transfers could also be explained by an altruistic parameter in the incumbent's
utility function, a possibility which is discounted  in all of these models.
The discussion above implies that incumbents  can observe the individual  vi directly. This is
obviously unrealistic,  but incumbents  may be able to estimate voter preferences by looking at geographic
patterns in prior electoral outcomes. For example,  incumbents could assume that all voters in a province
are identical or, more plausibly, that the distribution  of preferences differs systematically  across provinces
(Dixit and Londregan). It can be shown that the probability that a randomly selected voter in province d
will have voted for a party j is equivalent  to the share of the vote for party j in province d (Deacon and
Shapiro 1975). Voters in provinces in which 50% of the population voted for the incumbent in the last
election are therefore most likely to be marginal: the probability that they supported the incumbent is
exactly the same as the probability that they supported other candidates. The same logic obviously
applies to core supporters, who are most likely to be found in districts which voted heavily for the
incumbent. Finally, comparing the results from two or more past elections enables incumbents  to identify
districts in which voters are most likely to have switched support from the incumbent to the opposition.
12 I thank  one  anonymous  referee  for this  suggestion.  Note  that  this  is a different  use of the term "buy-back"  from
that  found  in  numerous  other  papers  (for  example,  Gershberg  1994,  Bruhn  1996),  where  "buy-back"  refers  simply  to
the negative  coefficient  on a regression  of expenditures  on the  level of the pro-government  vote  in the most  recent
election,  rather  than  the negative  coefficient  on  the change in the pro-government  vote. Insofar  as the vote  on this
most  recent  election  is not compared  to the vote  in a prior  election,  however,  there  is no way of telling  whether  these
voters  are being  bought  back or wooed  for the first  time.
13 This  may  be less of an issue  in Peru,  since  voting  at presidential  elections  is compulsory,  and electoral
participation  tends  to be high.
12Two-tier  elections,  taxes and transfers in Peru
To test the predictive power of the formal models discussed above, we must make some additional
assumptions about two features of elections and expenditures peculiar to the Peruvian setting: the two-
tiered structure of presidential elections, and the geographic incidence of the taxes, if any, which must be
raised to finance expenditures.
Presidential elections in Peru are often decided in two stages: if no candidate receives a simple
majority in the first round of the election, a run-off election is held between the two candidates with the
largest number of votes. In the 1990 election,  Vargas Llosa was ahead by a small margin after the first
round of voting on April 8 (32.6% to Fujimori's 29.1%), but lost by a large margin in the second round
held on June 10 (37.6% to Fujimon's 62.4%). Candidate Fujimori  was a virtual unknown in many areas
of the country until shortly  before the first round of the election (Stokes 1  996b, Carri6n 1996, Schmidt
1996), but he had become a household name two months later. Because  voters in Peru were arguably
constrained  by lack of information in the first round of the election,  I use the results of the ran-off election
for all estimations  below.
Transfer programs  like FONCODES  are generally paid for out of tax revenues. Since taxes have a
geographic incidence pattern which could also affect electoral outcomes, one might be concerned with the
distribution of "net transfers", the per capita difference  betwveen  transfers and taxes needed to finance a
program.
FONCODES  was initially funded with the proceeds of privatizations done early on in Fujimori's
first term, rather than from tax revenues. When these resources became scarce, the Peruvian  government
appealed to the World Bank and the Inter-American  Develcpment Bank for funding, and two loans for
US $ 100  million and US $ 94 million,  respectively,  were made available to FONCODES in early 1994.14
These loans included provisions for a five-year grace periocl  and full amortization over seventeen  years--
presumably, well after President Fujimori  would have left effice.  Theory suggests that fully rational
voters should take into account the net present value of the e-xpected  taxes that would  have to be raised in
the future to repay the loans.  In practice, however, short timle  horizons, lack of information, and the
1 Determining  the exact  moment  at which  foreign  funding  becarne  available  is not straightforward.  The  World
Bank  loan,  for example,  was approved  in December  1993,  became  effective  in March  1994.  and disbursement
against  it began  in May 1994. But the loan  included  a proviso  that up to US $ 10 million  could  be used  to fund
eligible  comnuunity-based  projects  approved  since  August  1, 1993,.  There  is also  controversy  about  the extent  to
which  multilateral  organizations  like  the World  Bank,  the Inter-American  Development  Bank,  and  the International
Monetary  Fund  attempted  to convince  Fujimori  of the importance  of targeted  pro-poor  programs,  or went  along  with
Fujimori's  own  initiatives  only  reluctantly.  Although  the IMF  and  the Banks  had  some  initial  concems  about
FONCODES  (Kay,  Graham  1994),  the fact  that  FONCODES  was  very  similar  to other  programmes  funded  by the
World Bank and the Inter-American  Development  Bank throughout Latin America meant that loans for
FONCODES  could be justified because of their likely impact on the poor.
13possibility, real or imagined,  of debt re-negotiation  or default could limit the extent to which voters in
Peru consider these future costs. This paper only considers  FONCODES  transfers.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics  of socio-economic  characteristics, voting patterns and per
capita expenditures  made by FONCODES. It shows  that provinces in Peru vary a great deal on all of
these counts. The variation in per capita FONCODES expenditures  is particularly noteworthy: some
provinces received no transfers whatsoever, while others received more than six times the mean per capita
transfer.
Table 2: Socio-economic  characteristics,  voting patterns,  and FONCODES expenditures on
community-based projects
Mean  St Dev.  Median  25th  %  75th %  Min  Max
Population  97,165  118,630  58,168  28,814  116,486  185  692,265
FONCODES  index*  15.31  6.03  16.14  11.49  19.57  1.00  28.24
Proportion rural  44.92  30.49  49.88  14.40  72.29  0  91.00
Pro-Fujimori  vote: 1990**  65.37  13.70  65.07  56.32  75.01  17.76  93.35
Pro-Fujimori  vote: 1993**  50.60  12.05  51.52  45.78  58.77  12.17  80.05
Per capita expenditures***  31.18  28.97  24.25  13.59  41.71  0  191.83
TWs  is the "poverty"  index  used  by FONCODES  in 1996. It is a weighted  mean  of 8  variables--the  rate of
chronic  malnutrition  amongst  schoolchildren,  the rate  of illiteracy,  the proportion  of children  not in school,
and  the proportion  of households  who  live  in overcrowded  housing,  who  have  inadequate  roofing,  no access
to running  water,  no sewerage,  and no electricity,  respectively.  Higher  values  of the index  are an indication
of higher  poverty.  All values  are normalized  so that  the province  with  the lowest  amount  of poverty  has  a
value of  the FONCODES  index  equal  to 1.
**  Summary  statistics  for  the pro-Fujimori  vote  in 1990  and 1993  are population-weighted.  They  do not
correspond  exactly  to the actual  fractions  voting  for Fujimori  because  of differences  between  total  population
and  the population  of eligible  voters. Moreover,  electoral  data  for the second  round  of the 1990  presidential
election  is only  available  for 205  out of 224  provinces  which  existed  at the time.
***  This  refers  to per capita  expenditures  made  by FONCODES  on community-based  projects  between
December  1991  and  March  1995,  in 1992  soles.
Figures 2 and 3 show scatter diagrams and non-parametric (kernel) regressions  of the logarithm of
per capita FONCODES  expenditures as a function of the proportions voting for Fujimori in the 1990
presidential election and the 1993 referendum, respectively." 5 Figure 2 shows a positive correlation
between the 1990 Fujimori  vote and expenditures in the December 1991--October  1993 period, while
Figure 3 shows a negative correlation  between  the 1993 Fujimori  vote and expenditures in the November
15 Non-parametric  regression  analysis  can be thought  of as a moving  average.  The  expectation  of  Y (in this case,  the
log  of per capita  FONCODES  expenditures)  is estimated  conditional  on X (the  pro-govermnent  vote  in the 1990
election  or the 1993  referendum)  without  imposing  any  assumptions  about  functional  form. It is therefore  a much
more  flexible  and  accurate  way to represent  bivariate  associations  than, say,  Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS).  For an
excellent  introduction  to non-parametric  regressions  see  Deaton  (pp. 190-203),  as well as Silverman  (1986)  and
Hardle  (1991).  To avoid  dropping  provinces  which  received  zero  transfers,  I add 1  to per capita  expenditures  in
every  province  before  taking  logs (see  Maddala  1983,  p. 181,  for a similar  ad hoc  correction).
141993-March 1995 period. In both instances,  there appears to be some curvature in the relationship
between  the vote and expenditures.
Figure 2: Log FONCODES per capita expenditures and pro-Fujimori  vote in 1990
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Figure 3: Log FONCODES per capita expendituLres  and pro-Fujimori vote in 1993
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5  0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Figures 2 and 3 provide some  pnImafacie evidence that the distribution of FONCODES
expenditures  between 1991 and 1995 may have been responsive  to electoral influences, something  which
has been argued elsewhere (Graham and Kane, Kay, Roberts and Arce). However, much of this previous
work on the political use of discretionary social expenditures in Peru has some important limitations.
First, it frequently does not use a multivariate regression framework to separate political from other
effects. To see why this is likely to seriously  bias the results, consider FONCODES expenditure  patterns
after 1993. FONCODES spent more on poor provinces before and after the 1993 referendum, and these
poor provinces largely voted against the government  in 1993. Were expenditures made by FONCODES
after October 1993,  then, motivated by electoral considerations, redistributive  considerations,  or both?
Multivariate regression  analysis allows for a parsing out of the "political" and "technical" influences on
the distribution  of FONCODES expenditures. Second, previous studies generally test for a linear effect
of elections on the distribution of expenditures  (Graham and Kane). This approach does not allow for
non-linearities  which are at the heart of the marginal voter models,  or the dynamic changes in the buy-
back model.  1
6 Third, earlier work uses department-level  (rather than province- or district-level)
information on the distribution of FONCODES expenditures  and the vote in various elections. This
seriously diminishes  the sample size and makes it difficult to run meaningful regressions. Even more
important,  however, in Peru there are often very large differences  in the vote within departments. In the
department  of Amazonas, for example, only 23.2% of the population of the province of Condorcanqui,
but 60.0% of the population of neighboring  Bongara voted for the government  in 1993. More formally,
the total variance in the distribution of the pro-government  vote can be decomposed into inter-department
and intra-department  components (for example, Cowell 1995). Such a decomposition  shows  that less
than half of the total variation in the vote in the 1990  election and the 1993 referendum (43.0% and
46.8%, respectively)  is accounted for by differences  across departments. Since all of this information  was
published, it is hard to believe that the government  would deliberately  have chosen not to make use of it.
Finally, the results presented by Graham and Kane and others do not acknowledge  that estimates of the
influence of elections on FONCODES  expenditures after 1993 may be contaminated by simultaneity  bias.
I now turn to this question.
16 This  is a shortcoming  of much  of the empirical  literature  on political  influences  on expenditure  patterns  (i.e.
Gershberg  1994).  Wright's  analysis  of geographic  patterns  in the distribution  of discretionary  funds during  the New
Deal  is one early  and important  exception.  More  recently,  Case  finds  evidence  that expenditure  patterns  in Albania
conform  to the predictions  made  in  the Lindbeck-Weibull  model.
16Econometric specification
Formally estimating  the (possible) impact of elections on expenditures presents a number of
econometric complications. Simultaneity  bias is perhaps the most obvious. Consider  the following
equation:
(4)  Exppt = a + /3Elecyt,  + &±  pt +  ±pt
where Exppt  is per capita expenditures in province p at time t, E  lecptI is the outcome of an election in
province  p in the previous time period t-l,  z lpt  is a vector of other variables which affect the distribution
of expenditures, and spt  is the error term.  If the error term is auto-correlated  over time, it could be re-
written as:
(5)  £pt = P'pt-I + Vpt
where p is the auto-correlation  coefficient. Equation (4) then becomes:
(6)  Exppt =  a + /Elecpti  + &lpt + ppt-i+  vpt
Politicians attempt  to manipulate expenditures  because they believe that another equation also
applies:
(7)  Elecp, = X + vExp,, + 7z2pt + wpt
where z2pt  is a vector of other variables which affect election outcomes, and wpt  is the error term.  If both
(6) and (7) hold, it can easily  be shown that estimating  the parameter ,  by OLS will produce results which
are biased and inconsistent  (Deaton 1997,  pp. 97-98). The intuition is that electoral outcomes are
themselves "contaminated" by expenditures in the previous time period(s).
Bias is induced when both conditions-serial  correlation  in the error term, and an effect of
expenditures  on elections-are  met. In practice, there is often good reason to suspect that the error term
8pt  is positively auto-correlated  over time. Demand-driven  programs like FONCODES probably involve a
cumulative acquisition of skills and knowledge by potential beneficiaries: it takes time to understand what
kinds of projects are eligible for funding, practice  to prepare a good proposal, and time to develop
contacts with the social fund staff who are ultimately  responsible for review of the application. If there is
such a learning  curve, cominunities which prepare a successful proposal once should find it easier to do
so again, while others which are turned down might decide  that applying  for funding is not worth the
effort after all.  In terms of (6) above, positive and negative shocks to the error term in one period are
likely to be carried forward into the next period. Meanwhile, the presumption that social expenditures
17may affect electoral outcomes seems reasonable. Since there may well be serial correlation and an effect
of expenditures  on elections, studies  which disregard  the possibility of simultaneity must be treated with
caution (see, for example, Bruhn, Graham and Kane).
The standard solution  to this simultaneity problem is instrumental variables. But the search for
appropriate instruments is not simple: variables which affect elections  tend to affect expenditures as well.
The Peruvian case offers a partial solution  to this problem, however,  because we may legitimately  be able
to treat the 1990  election as exogenous  to the model. FONCODES did not fund any projects until more
than a year after the 1990 election. The election cannot therefore have been affected by FONCODES
expenditures,  equation (7) does not apply, and simultaneity should not be a source of bias in the
parameters estimated in (4) for the December 1991-October 1993  period. The break in FONCODES
expenditures  before December 1991 may therefore  work as a "natural experiment"  which allows us to
accurately identify the effect of an election on expenditures (Deaton, pp. 112-115). More generally, this
result highlights the value of research which focuses on new social programs  to estimate  the impact of
elections on public expenditure  patterns. 17 Estimates  of the effect of elections on expenditures after
October 1993  are more open to question because the 1993 referendum  may itself have been determined  in
part by FONCODES expenditures in the preceding period.
Lack of comprehensive  data and censoring  are both potential sources of bias. Information  on the
results of the run-off 1990  presidential election is not available for 19 provinces. Also, seven new
provinces were created between 1990 and 1995. As a result, there is data on FONCODES expenditures
for 231 provinces,  but data on elections for only 205 provinces.
There is nothing distinctive  about the provinces for which electoral data is missing--they  are not,
for example, particularly  poor or rich, or concentrated in one part of the country. As a safeguard,
however, I run additional regressions  in which the missing values are replaced with the relevant
departmental averages. 8 The results (not reported) are very similar to those which do not include these
provinces, suggesting  that this is not a source  of bias.
17 Unless,  of course,  the new  program  was  promised  before  an election,  the promnise  was  regarded  as credible,  and  it
influenced  the outcome  of the election  (Avinash  Dixit,  personal  communication  with  the author,  April  1998).
Fujimori  committed  himself  to not implementing  the kind  of "shock"  adjustment  program  advocated  by his
opponent  Mario  Vargas  Llosa,  a commitment  he quickly  broke  after  the election.  His  platform  also  made  references
to continued  subsidies  for  basic  consumer  goods,  and  to the promotion  of small  domestic  industries  (1  thank  an
anonymous  referee  for this  information).  The  results  for the 1991-1993  period  will  only  be contaminated  by
endogeneity  bias,  however,  if Fujimori's  campaign  promises  were  credible  and  specific  enough  to enable  voters  in
different  provinces  to predict  differences  in the transfers  they  could  expect  to  receive  from  a program  "like"
FONCODES  (since  FONCODES  itself  was  never  mentioned  in the campaign).
18  For example,  there  are no electoral  results  for the seven  provinces  in the department  of Apurimac,  but  we know
that 81.54%  of the population  of the department  voted  for Fujimori.  These  regressions  would  therefore  assume  that
the pro-Fujimori  vote  in each  of the seven  provinces  was 81.54%.
18FONCODES  financed no community-based  projects in 1]2  provinces between  December 1991 and
October 1993,  and in another 12 provinces between  November 1993 and March 1995 (six of the
provinces overlap). Censoring of this sort can make OLS estimates biased and inconsistent. Tobit
regressions  are routinely  used as a solution  to this problem, but Tobit estimates will also be biased and
inconsistent  if, as is often the case, the distribution  of the error term is heteroskedastic. An alternative
estimator, Powell's censored Least Absolute Deviations  (LAD) estimator, is unbiased and consistent but
requires large amounts of data (see Deaton, pp. 85-90, for an excellent  introduction  to these issues). In
practice, the bias induced  by censoring in the regressions in this paper is likely to be small because
censoring affects less than 6% of the sample. I therefore present OLS estimates,  and make a note when
the Tobit or Powell  estimators produce noticeably different results.
Estimates ofpolitical effects: the 1991-93  period
Table 3 presents estimates of the impact of various parameters on the logarithm of per capita
FONCODES  expenditures between  December 1991  and October 1993. Column  (i) reports the result of
an OLS regression on three parameters of interest only: the measures of marginality,  core support, and
initial consumption  (Cox and McCubbins, Lindbeck  and Weibull, Dixit and Londregan). "Non-
marginality" is proxied by the absolute deviation of the vote from 50% (as in Case), and core support by
the vote for Fujimori;19  consumption,  finally, is proxied by the composite poverty index developed by
FONCODES  in 1996.20  Note that one cannot test a genuine "buy-back" model for the 1991-1993  period
because Fujimori  was elected for the first time in 1990.21
If variables are omitted from the model, and these variables are correlated with the measures of
marginality, core support, or the FONCODES index, the coefficients on these parameters will be biased
and inconsistent in the usual way. I address  this problem by including  a large number of controls. The
OLS regression for column (ii) includes parameters for the (log of the) population of a province, and the
'9  Alternatively,  "core  supporters"  could  have  been  approximated  by the vote  for Fujimori  in the first  round  of the
election,  and "swing  voters"  by the additional  vote  for Fujimori  in the second  round  of the election  (Chang  Tai-
Hsieh,  personal  communication  with  the author,  September  1998). One  disadvantage  of this procedure  in the
Peruvian  context  is that  it would  further  have  limited  the sample  size,  as the results  of the first round  of the 1990
presidential  election  are available  only  for 180  of the 224  provinces  w.hich  existed  at the time.
FONCODES  has  made  adjustments  to the index  it uses  every  year--taking  out some  individual  indicators,
including  new  ones,  and  changing  the weights  given  to each  one. The  indices  used  before  1996  were  disaggregated
at the province  level  only. Since  I disaggregated  the province  of Metropolitan  Lima  into  its individual  districts,  only
the 1996  index  could  be used  for  the analysis.  Because  most  of the individual  indicators  tend  to be highly  correlated
with  one another,  however,  the choice  of index  is unlikely  to have  an important  effect  on the results. The  results  in
Tables  3 and 5 are robust  to alternative  measures  of "consumption",  such  as the province-level  estimates  of imputed
income  and  imputed  proportion  below  the poverly  line  developed  by r3NEI  (Schady  1999).
21 Moreover,  given  the dramatic  changes  in the Peruvian  political  landscape  in the early 1990's  and  the fact  that
Fujimori  was not  the candidate  of one  of the established  parties,  he could  not  reasonably  hope  to extract  information
from  presidential  elections  held  before  1990.
19proportion rural. The large t-statistic on the FONCODES index in columns (i) and (ii) suggests that it is
important  that the relationship between expenditures and the index be specified correctly. To account for
possible non-linearities  in this relationship,  I include a Fourier senres  expansion of the FONCODES  index
in column (iii). 22 In addition,  this regression includes  numerous socio-economic  controls listed at the foot
of the table, and a dummy variable for border provinces. This border dummy is included as a control
because FONCODES may have spent differently in areas near the volatile Ecuadorian border. Finally,
the specification  in column (iii) includes 25 department-level  dummies. FONCODES' regional offices
generally correspond  to departments,  and these dummies  are meant to capture differences in institutional
capacity across offices, as well as any other possible department-level  differences.
Table 3: The impact of the second-round  1990 presidential  election on the distribution  of per
capita FONCODES expenditures  on community-based  projects, December 1991-October  1993
(i)  (ii)  (iii)
Percent vote for Fujimori  0.023***  0.028***  0.023**
(2.59)  (3.02)  (2.07)
Abs. value (%/.  for Fujimori-50)  -0.002  -0.010  -0.030**
(0.24)  (0.94)  (2.11)
In (FONCODES  index)  0.696***  0.456***  --
(6.07)  (2.61)
In (population)  --  -0.046  0.179***
(0.58)  (2.63)
Percent rural  0.006  -0.002
(1.64)  (0.28)
Additional  controls  No  No  Yes
F-test  9.61***  11.85***  2.34*
R-squared  0.434  0.445  0.761
Number of observations  205  205  205
*indicates  significance at the 10% level; **indicates  significance at the 5% level; ***indicates  significance at the
1% level.
Note: Absolute t-statistics are reported in brackets, and are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors.
An F-test on both political  variables is also reported. A constant was calculated  but not reported.
Additional controls: A Fourier series expansion  of the FONCODES index, province-level  averages for the age of
the household head, the average number of years of schooling of household members, the occupation  of all adults
in the household, separate  variables for the proportion of households who own a car, a refrigerator, color  TV, and
black and white TV, the proportion of the population that is indigenous (defined as those whose mother tongue is
a language other  than Spanish),  the infant mortality rate, a dummy  variable for border provinces, and twenty-five
departmental  dummies.
22 A Fourier  series  expansion  of the FONCODES  index  includes  terms  for  the log of the FONCODES  index,  its
square,  the sine of the log of the index and the sine of twice the log of the index, the cosine of the log of the index
and the cosine of twice the log of the index. As usual,  the logarithm of the FONCODES  index had to be re-scaled to
prevent values smaller than -x or larger than i.  The coefficient on the FONCODES  index is not reported in column
(iii) in Table 3, or in columns (iii) and (vi) in Table 5  because it is meaningless on its own when the square, sine and
cosine parameters  are included in the regression.
20The results in Table 3 show that marginal voters, core supporters,  and the poor all received a
disproportionate  share of FONCODES expenditures. The coefficient  on the measure of non-marginality
is always negative, and is significant at the 5% level when all of the controls are added; the coefficient on
the measure of core support is positive and significant at the 5% level in every specification. 23 Note that
this is a very strong  result indeed: the political variables are significant even after dozens of controls,
including sophisticated  non-linear measures of the poverty of a province, are incorporated into the model.
Finally, the coefficient on the FONCODES index is positive and significant at the 1% level, showing that
FONCODES spent significantly  more on the poor.  The sign on the coefficients when the parameters are
estimated with Tobit or Powell's censored LAD is the same, and the magnitude of the effects of the
political variables  and the FONCODES  index tends to be larger than the corresponding  OLS estimates.
The only important difference  is that the censored LAD estimates produce larger standard errors, so that
the political coefficients are no longer significant  when all of the controls are included.
How large are these estimated effects? Table 4 reports  the predicted effect of one-standard
deviation changes in core support, marginality,  and the (log of the) FONCODES index on per capita
FONCODES expenditures. Column  (ii), which corresponds  to column (ii) in Table 3, shows that, ceteris
paribus, a one standard deviation increase in the vote for Fujimori resulted in a 55% increase in per capita
expenditures,  while a one standard deviation increase in marginality resulted in a 13% increase in per
capita expenditures. Increases  in poverty also have a large imrpact  on expenditures:  a one standard
deviation increase in the (log of the) FONCODES index resulted in a 34% increase in per capita
expenditures.
Table 4: The magnitude of political and poverty effects on the distribution of per capita
FONCODES  expenditures  on community-based  prcects,  December 1991-October  1993
W  0~(i)  (iii)
Percent  vote  for Fujimori  43.29  54.83  44.88
Abs.  value  (%  for Fujimori-50)  -2.65  -12.54  -39.67
In (FONCODES  index)  56.08  33.86
Table 4 suggests that the effect of the two political variables is large indeed, especially as the
number of controls increases. But interpretation of the magnitude of the political effects is not
23 If politicians  maxiniize  the probability  of being  re-elected,  rather  ithan  the expected  number  of votes,  the positive
coefficient  on the pro-Fujimori  vote  could  also  be a measure  of the "partisan  reward"  for  the supporters  of the
stronger  party  predicted  in the modified  Lindbeck-Weibull  model  (Lindbeck  and Weibull,  Case). More  generally,
there  is no obvious  way  to disentangle  the effect  of "core support"  from  that  of "partisan  reward"  when  the
incumbent  is also  the stronger  of the two  parties  (Mark  Thomas,  personal  communication  with  the author,  March
1998).
21straightforward  because marginality  and core support work against each other at levels of support for
Fujimori  above 50%: for instance, a province  in which 75% of the population voted for Fujimori could
expect to receive large or small per capita transfers, depending  on whether the effect of core-support  or
marginality is more important. To clarify  this matter, Figure 4 graphs predicted expenditures  at various
levels of support for Fujimori  for each of the specifications  in Table 3.  Other variables in the regressions
are kept constant at their means. 24 Figure 4 shows that the estimated effect of core support is much larger
than that of marginality  when only the two political variables  and the FONCODES index are included in
the regression (specification  (i)), but the effect of marginality increases noticeably with the number of
controls (specification  (iii)).
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'Me Peruvian political  landscape  changed  dramatically  between  1990 and  1993.  In the  1993
referendum,  Fujimori  generally  did well in wealthier  urbarx areas, especially  Lima, but he lost the  support
of large segments  of lower-class  and rural voters  who had brought him into office in 1990 (Stokes  1996b,
24 Mechanically,  this can  be done  by multiplying  the coefficient  on non-political  parameters  in  the regression  by the
mean value for the parameter im  question, and then adding them to the constant in the regression. The coefficients
on thie  measures of core support  and non-marginality  are then used to predict expenditures at every level of the vote
between 0 and 100%.
0.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2Roberts and Arce). What effect did these massive shifts in Fujimori's constituency  have on the
distribution of FONCODES expenditures?
Table 5 below reports results from a set of regressions  of per capita FONCODES expenditures
between  November 1993 and March 1995 on the results of the 1993 referendum. Columns  (i) through
(iii) are based on regressions of expenditures on measures of core support and non-marginality  from the
1993  referendum. These specifications  therefore test a model similar to that which was found to have had
an important  effect on the 1991-1993  distribution  of FONCODES expenditures,  updated with the results
of the 1993 referendum. Columns  (iv) through (vi) are based on regressions  of expenditures on the
change in the pro-Fujimori  vote. 25 These specifications  therefore test a genuine buy-back model.  One
shortcoming  of this approach is the fact that the 1990 presidential election and the 1993 referendum  were
different in character: in the 1993 referendum  voters could "safely" express opposition  to part of
Fujimori's programme  without having to choose  an alternative (Graham and Kane, p. 82, Roberts and
Arce, p. 229).
Table 5: The impact of the 1993 referendum  on the distribution  of per capita FONCODES
expenditures  on community-based  projects, November 1993-March 1995
Level  of  pro-Fujimori  vote  Change  in  pro-Fujimori  vote
(i  (ii)  (iiii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)
1993  referendum:  % vote  for  -0.005  -0.005  -0.010*
Fujimori  (1.16)  (1.30)  (1.91)
1993  referendum:  abs.  vaL  -0.006  -0.011**  0.0o  - - -
(%forFujimori-50)  (1.15)  (2.22)  (O.C1)
Change  in pro-Fujimori  vote  - - - -0.283*  -0.391***  -0.560***
(vote  90-vote  93)/vote  90  (1.76)  (2.58)  (2.93)
In (FONCODES  index)  1.01***  0.746***  - 0.879***  0.554***  -
(17.47)  (9.11)  (9.57)  (4.59)
In (population)  _  -0.087  0.037  - -0.101*  0.010
(1.33)  (0.48)  (1.82)  (0.17)
Proportion  rural  --  0.007***  -0.005  - 0.007***  -0.007
(2.89)  (0.97)  (2.95)  (1.27)
Additional  controls  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes
F-test  (1)  0.86  2.57*  1.95  - - -
R-squared  0.514  0.548  0.759  0.529  0.567  0.803
Number  of observations  230  230  230  205  205  205
* indicates  significance  at the 10%  level;  ** indicates  significance  at the 5%  level; ***  indicates  significance  at the
1%  level.
Note:  Absolute  t-statistics  are  reported  in  brackets,  and  are based  on  heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors. A
constant  was calculated  but not  reported.
F-test  (1):  F-test  on the measures  of non-marginality  and  core support  from  the 1993  referendum.  For  a list of
controls,  see  note  at the foot  of Table  3.
25 "Change"  is defined  as the 1993  pro-Fujimori  vote  minus  the 1990  pro-Fujimori  vote,  divided  by the pro-Fujimori
vote  in 1990.  Dividing  through  by the results  of the 1990  presidential  election  recognizes  that, say, a 5%  reduction
in the pro-Fujimori  vote  is unlikely  to mean  the same  thing  in  a province  in which  70%  of the population  had  voted
for Fujimori  in 1990  as in one  in which  the original  level  of support  in 1990  was  only  20%.
23The results in Tables 5 should be interpreted  with caution. As I argue above, if FONCODES
expenditures between December 1991 and October 1993  had an effect on the outcome of the 1993
referendum,  any regression of expenditures  after October 1993 which includes  the results of the
referendum as an explanatory  variable is likely to be contaminated  by simultaneity  bias.  Bearing  this
caveat in mind, however, the results in Table 5 suggest that changes in the vote between 1993 and 1990,
rather than simply  the level of government  support in the 1993 referendum, influenced the distribution  of
FONCODES expenditures  after 1993. The coefficients on the measures of marginal vote and core
support are jointly insignificant at the 5% level in all of the specifications. By contrast, the coefficient  on
the change in the pro-Fujimori vote is significant at the 1% level or better in two of the three
specifications  in Table 5. Roberts and Arce argue that Fujimori attempted to "recapture the loyalty of the
popular sectors" by picking up the pace of poverty-alleviation  programmes after 1993. The results in
Table 5 suggest that social expenditures channeled  through FONCODES were used for such a buy-back
strategy in a very focussed  way: FONCODES projects were specifically  directed at provinces which had
supported Fujimori  in 1990, but had abandoned  him in 1993.
Tables 5 shows  that poverty continued to be an important determinant  of per capita expenditures:
the coefficient on the (log of the) FONCODES  index is positive, large, and highly significant in all
specifications. Rurality is also associated with significantly  higher per capita expenditures (columns (ii),
(v)). 26 This finding does not conform with an extensive literature in the political economy of
development  which argues that vocal and organized urban constituencies  in LDCs siphon off the bulk of
public funds (Bates 1981,  Nelson 1992, Graham 1997). FONCODES expenditures in the November
1993-March 1995 period favored rural areas, perhaps because  there were other social programs in Peru at
the time which were directed at urban populations. 27
What, finally, can we say about the magnitude of these effects? Table 6 summarizes  the effect of
one-standard deviation changes in the log of the FONCODES index and the measure of the change in pro-
Fujimori support on the distribution of per capita FONCODES expenditures. The results suggest that the
political influence on the distribution of FONCODES expenditures  continued to be large: a one standard
deviation decrease in the pro-Fujimori vote resulted in anything  between a 16% and a 34% increase in per
capita expenditures. Meanwhile, the effect of poverty on the distribution  of FONCODES expenditures
appears to have increased  after the referendum. This result is consistent with those reported elsewhere
26 Interpretation  of the coefficients  on  the proportion  rural  and  population  size  in columns  (iii),  (vi)  and (ix)  is not
straightforward  because  of the high  degree  of collinearity  between  these  variables  and  all of the additional  controls.
The same  caveat  obviously  applies  to column  (iii)  in Table  3 as well.
27 These  included  two  housing  programs  (ENACE,  Banco  de Materiales);  a program  for the construction  of
electricity,  water  and sanitation  systems  (UTE-FONAVI);  a small  welfare  program  for destitute  families  (INABJIF);
and  a school  construction  program  which  spent  mainly  on urban  schools  (INFES)  (see  World  Bank 1996).
24(Paxson and Schady),  which show that the targeting of FONCODES investments  to the poor improved
over time. 28
Table 6: The magnitude of political and poverty effects on the distribution  of per capita
FONCODES expenditures  on community-based  projects, November 1993-March 1995
(i)  (n)  (iii)
Decrease  in the pro-Fujimori  vote  15.80  22.43  33.62
In (FONCODES  index)  75.44  42.53
6.  Conclusion
This paper uses formal econometric modeling  and a rich, highly disaggregated  data set to analyze
the effect of elections on the timing and distribution  of expenditures made by the Peruvian Social Fund
between 1991 and 1995. One important advantage  of this approach is that it allows for a parsing out of
the political and technical influences on FONCODES expenditures. I argue that there is a large,
significant effect of elections on the timing and distribution  of FONCODES expenditures. Expenditures
were boosted before national elections; community-based  projects were channeled  to provinces where the
political returns where expected to be large.
The results in this paper show that FONCODES  has clearly been responsive  to political
imperatives. Indeed,  FONCODES was arguably  very well suited for President Fujimori's electoral
ambitions. Unlike most programs conducted by the line ministries in Peru, FONCODES expenditures  are
truly discretionary:  since 1993,  FONCODES has had a backlog of thousands of project proposals which
could be funded at opportune  times, in provinces deemed to be electorally important. Polls suggest that
FONCODES projects are closely identified with the presidency and with President Fujimori himself
(Moncada, p. 62).
But FONCODES  also appears to have had an important redistributive  function. My results show
that FONCODES  funds flowed disproportionately  towards poor provinces. Household survey data
indicate that the infrastructure constructed  by FONCODES reaches a larger fraction of households,
especially  poor households, than other programs in the Ministry of the Presidency (Paxson and Schady,
World Bank 1999). Such success reaching the poor can in part;  be explained by the fact that FONCODES
has been free of many of the restrictions, paperwork and inefficiencies  that have given the public sector in
Latin America a bad name.
Was FONCODES,  then, an effective  poverty alleviation program or a brazen attempt to buy votes?
28  Paxson  and Schady  present  nonparanetric  regressions  and  "concentration  curves"  for FONCODES  expenditures
on education  projects,  by year. The  curves  show  that  the cumulative  fraction  of resources  flowing  to poor  districts
was  unambiguously  higher  in 1994  and 1995  than  in 1992  and 1993.
25There  is no simple  answer  to this question  because  it appears  that decisions  about  FONCODES  funding
were  made  on the basis  of both political  and  technical  criteria. Ironically,  it is precisely  those  features
which  enabled  FONCODES  to reach  the  poor, such  as a high degree  of flexibility  in the allocation,
timing,  and  composition  of expenditures,  which  made  it particularly  vulnerable  to political  interference.
This  tension  between  effective  redistribution  and "pork  barrel"  policies  need  be no coincidence:  Nelson
argues  that pro-poor  programs  are  much  more  likely  to be implemented  when  the executive  keeps
''control  over  patronage".
The government  of President  Alberto  Fujimori  has privatized  state-owned  enterprises,  liberalized
markets,  and  slashed  subsidies  and  tariffs  in Peru. Fujinori  has thus  eliminated  many  of the  tools which
incumbents  have  traditionally  used  to enlist  the support  of important  constituencies  before  an election
(Herbst  1990,  Grindle  1996). Of course,  low  inflation  and high rates  of economic  growth  also bring
important  returns  at the  polls-returns that may  far exceed  those from  the more  interventionist  policies  of
yore  (Nelson,  Przeworski  1993,  Stokes  1996a).  This  paper  shows,  however,  that old  populist  habits  die
hard.
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